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While historians have consistently focused on the development of German, French, and British 
ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚtĂƌ ?ĨĞǁŚĂǀĞƚƌƵůǇĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚŶĞƵƚƌĂůĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶ
defining the strategic paradigm of 1914. Belgium held the strategic key to the opening salvos of a 
future Franco-German war, and each of its Guarantors were determined to obtain the initiative. While 
German planners were prepared to seize it by force, the Entente (particularly Britain), remained wary 
of its obligations. Instead, Britain sought to determine Belgian intentions and capabilities through 
secret and unbinding staff conversations in 1906 and 1912. The former proved useful in establishing 
a framework for co-operation but ultimately came to nothing. By the time they were resumed in 1912, 
Anglo-Belgian diplomatic relations hĂĚƐŽƵƌĞĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚŝƚƐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞĂƐ
a colonial power gave it a renewed sense of confidence. Belgian officials were determined to retain 
ƚŚĞŬŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĐǇ ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŝƚƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚEntente suggestions of 
pre-emptive action. Neutrality was subordinated to independence, which itself could not be 
guaranteed were Belgium to conclude even the loosest of military accords. Consequently, Entente 
plans were forced surrender the strategic initiative to the Germans. 
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When the Belgian army took up its positions facing its borders in August 1914, it did so in strict 
accordance with the laws governing its neutral status. Unsure of who the first transgressor would be, 
the mobilisation of the small field force, comprising approximately 117,000 regular and 73,000 
auxiliaries, was a clear sign that the kingdom was prepared to buttress neutrality with a show of arms.1 
This had not always been ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?&ŽƌĞŝŐŶŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐŚĂĚƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĂŶĚ
ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨŝƚƐƚƌŽŽƉƐĐŽƵůĚƚƌƵůǇďĞƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƌƐ ? ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
majority returning from long periods of furlough, might suggest they had a point.2 Along with other 
ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐŽŶĞĐĂǀĂůƌǇĂŶĚƐŝǆŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ
divisions were a reflection of a long-term military policy gone wrong. For three decades, the ruling 
Catholic Party had sought to minimise military expenditure to appease its electoral support in rural 
Flanders, preferring to place undue confidence in the international laws guaranteeing independence. 
^ŽĐŝĂů ŝƐƐƵĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƐƵĨĨƌĂŐĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐŝŵŵĞƌŝŶŐ ůinguistic tensions 
dominated the political scene from the 1880s, relegating military reform to the peripheries of public 
discourse.3 Add to that diplomatic complications and a general uncertainty in Belgian operational 
planning in the years preceding the First World War, few truly knew what to expect of this woefully 
unprepared army once German boots headed towards Liège on 4 August 1914. 
The urgency of the matter had not been lost on the army itself. Senior officers had campaigned 
for the introduction of universal conscription along the Prussian model since the mid-1860s, arguing 
that neutrality, as guaranteed by the Great Powers in 1839, meant little without an army capable of 
defending it. Geographically situated between France and Germany, the balance of power in Europe 
depended on a strong Belgium to dissuade either of its neighbours from using it as a military 
thoroughfare that might plunge the entire continent into war. But when, in 1911, Lieutenant-General 
Georges Eugène Victor Ducarne, former Chief of the Belgian General Staff from 1905-10, published a 
series of articles in Le Soir ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘ƌĞtĞZĞĂĚǇ ? ? ?ŝƚďĞĐĂŵĞƉĂŝŶĨƵůůǇĞǀŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŶŽƐƵĐŚĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶƚ
existed.4 The evolving recruitment laws, which had passed from the ballot to a voluntary system 
(1902), and then onto a one-son per family form of tempered conscription (1909), still left the army 
proportionately weaker than its likely enemies.5 Only in the post-Agadir furore did significant changes 
to the military establishment appear likely.6 Meanwhile, its defensive system and strategic thinking, 
which had last received significant attention with the construction of the Meuse fortresses (1887-91), 
was beginning to look antiquated. The redevelopment of the national redoubt at Antwerp from 1906, 
and the eventual introduction of universal conscription in May 1913, afforded some hope that Belgium 
might offer more than token resistance in the event of an invasion, but these measures would take a 
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full decade to mature. In short, the army was not adequately prepared for the role a future war might 
ask it to play. 
Amidst the tumult of the two Moroccan Crises in 1905 and 1911, when Europe looked certain 
to go to war, many eyes turned to Belgium. With a dense railway network and easy access between 
unfortified portions of the Franco-German border, it provided a clear strategic advantage to whichever 
belligerent reached an understanding with its government or deigned to violate it first. Thus, 
concerted efforts were made by all sides to determine Belgian intentions. The former was 
inconceivable, but questions abounded both within its borders, and beyond, as to whether this 
ramshackle army could, or would, realistically be committed to its defence.7 State visits were 
speculated at in the press, diplomatic channels surged into operation, and military attachés cast a 
watchful eye. General Staffs drew up operational plans in anticipation of a multitude of eventualities, 
which might require them to commit armies across the neutralised zone. The Schlieffen Plan, Plan 
Xs// ?ĂŶĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƌĞǁĞůůƚŽŽĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŽďĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚŚĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŝƌ
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝƐƚĞƐƚĂŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĞůŐŝĂŶƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?8 Yet, barring a few exceptions, the 
historiography of pre-war planning has tended to margiŶĂůŝƐĞ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ
influence in defining the strategic parameters of August 1914.9  
From a Belgian perspective, committing forces in defence of its territorial integrity was never 
in doubt. The manner and extent of such action, however, eǀŽůǀĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞ
of arrival on the European stage. Thus, when secret and unbinding conversations were initiated 
between the British and Belgian General Staffs in 1906, the prospect of military co-operation in the 
event of a German invasion appeared to offer both parties a cogent response to this hypothetical 
situation. After all, it was fairly common knowledge that German planners intended to violate Belgian 
neutrality in a future war and that militarily there would be little opposition.10 Yet, by the resumption 
of conversations between the two General Staffs in 1912, the diplomatic and military landscape had 
ĂůƚĞƌĞĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐĂŶŶĞǆĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞŽŶŐŽ&ƌĞĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ŚĂĚ ůĞĚƚŽĂĐŽŽůŝŶŐ in 
relations with the Entente, but had equally imbued its officials with a confidence that outstripped the 
military reforms being undertaken. Suspicion of Entente machinations had grown and were met with 
ĂŶĞǁĂŶĚƌĞŝŶǀŝŐŽƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐĚƵƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƐĂŶĞƵƚƌĂů ? /ƚ ƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞ
implication that Entente forces might be forced into Belgium pre-emptively to meet a German 
invasion. Belgium was determined to retain its agency and freedom of action. Neutrality was but a 
means of guaranteeing independence and, as such, the army was not to be sacrificed for the sake of 
an ideal, nor the country to the consequences of a military accord  W however unbinding. What this 
meant in reality was unknown, but Entente pressure to establish whether its plans could rely on a 
stable and amenable Belgium only hardened Belgian resolve to withhold co-operation. That the 1906 
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talks had provided traction for the development of a continental commitment within certain quarters 
ŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐǁĂƐŶŽƚĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ?11 Upholding neutrality and safeguarding its 
independence was. As a result, the strategic paradigm shifted. Anglo-French plans could not be 
harmonised prior to the outbreak of hostilities, which handed the German army the strategic initiative. 
Much subsequently depended on the moribund Belgian army. 
II 
Despite suggestions both during and after the war that Belgium had contravened the terms of its 
nĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĂďŝŶĚŝŶŐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ
ǁĂƐĞǀĞƌŵĂĚĞ ?ŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ĂĨƚĞƌƌĂŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞůŐŝĂŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
archives in 1914, raised the profile of the conversations, but few bought into the accompanying 
narrative justifying the invasion.12 The swift riposte by Napoléon Eugène, Baron Beyens, the Belgian 
ambassador to Berlin from 1910- ? ? ? ŚĞůƉĞĚ ƚŽ ƐŚĂƉĞ ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? ,Ğ ǁƌŽƚĞ ?  ‘ ?Ɛ ?ƵĐŚ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ
grievances, sifted and re-sifted a hundred times over, which the German Government has flaunted, in 
order to vindicate itself, and to make the civilized world believe that Belgium, by her secret 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐǁŝƚŚŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ĨĂŝůĞĚŝŶŚĞƌŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂŶĞƵƚƌĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?13 Indeed, the implication that 
mobilisation, concentration and transport timetables for a BEF deployment to Belgium corresponded 
to an alliance, entirely misrepresented the effect of these documents on pre-war planning. As a 
number of Belgian historians were at pains to point out in the interwar years, no binding commitment 
was made by either side.14 It was, in the words of Lieutenant-Colonel Nathaniel Walter Barnardiston, 
ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĂƚƚĂĐŚĠ ĐŚĂƌŐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ƚĂůŬƐ ? ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ  ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚ Ă ŵƵƚƵĂů
exchange of views on the subjects under discussion and on the procedure to be followed in the event 
ŽĨĂƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨĞůŐŝĂŶŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?15 
ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽƵŐŚƚ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝdered 
extraordinary. The laws governing its neutrality, although vague, did not prohibit the exchange of 
information. In fact, it was a frequent occurrence throughout the nineteenth century. As Daniel H. 
dŚŽŵĂƐŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ'ƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŽsay Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia), who bore a collective and individual responsibility for guaranteeing independence, tended to 
ĞǆĞƌƚ Ă ƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ƌŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ŝŶƚŽ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?16 Therefore, it was not 
uncommon to find British officers visiting the military camp at Beverloo or inspecting the fortifications 
of Antwerp.17 ĨƚĞƌ Ăůů ? ĂŶǇ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ĞůŐŝĂŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ Ă 'ƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌ ?Ɛ
response to a crisis; including the likelihood of British aid arriving via the commercial centre.18 Military 
co-operation, therefore, was an essential tenet to survival. 
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This was exemplified at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, during which confidence in 
ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁĂƐŚĂŬĞŶ ?EŽƚŽŶůǇŚĂĚƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ ?ƐƐŚĂŵďŽůŝĐ
mobilisation revealed serious shortcomings in its recruiting system, but the rifled artillery used to 
ďŽŵďĂƌĚWĂƌŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽƌĞŶĚĞƌŶƚǁĞƌƉ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚĨŽƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽďƐŽůĞƚĞ ?19 More to 
the point, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the German Empire had altered European geopolitics 
to such an extent that the likelihood of a direct conquest of Belgium was supplanted by the prospect 
of a transitory invasion along the Meuse basin. Although exponents of a lightly armed neutrality 
pointed to the respect afforded the Treaty of London in 1870- ? ? ?&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽĨŽƌƚŝĨǇŝƚƐ
border with Belgium was, as David Stevenson noted,  ‘ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĂƐ ƚŽƌĂŝƐĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐ
ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ? ?20 In a future invasion, a Belgian army concentrated around Antwerp might be completely 
ignored. In order for Belgium to make its neutrality felt, two things were necessary. Firstly, the Meuse 
fortresses of Liège and Namur required modernising, and secondly, universal conscription would have 
to be implemented to provide a suitably-sized field army capable of acting as a deterrent. However, 
Belgian governments, be they Liberal or Catholic, were not inclined to increase the personal and 
financial military burden for fear of precipitating an electoral backlash. Consequently, the decision to 
update the Meuse fortifications was not taken until 1887, albeit at the expense of universal 
conscription.21 Thus, despite the completion of the forts in 1891, the army remained inadequate for 
the task at hand.  
Because Belgium did not appear militarily capable, the Great Powers took for granted its 
dependency on them to guarantee continued independence. While universal conscription was finally 
adopted in France through the three-year service law of 1889, Belgium remained hamstrung by the 
ballot system, which neither provided it with the numbers nor the quality of recruit to actively 
compete with the mass-armies likely to traverse its borders.22 The realists, however, would not be 
ŚĞĂƌĚ ? ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ŶƚǁĞƌƉ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƉůĂŶƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ
fortifications on the Meuse to be used primarily as pivots for the ĨŝĞůĚĂƌŵǇ ?ƐƉƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?23 
The concentration of forces on the central plain continued to dominate thinking, despite the wisdom 
of the old Jominian maxim of  ‘ǁŚŽĞǀĞƌŝƐŵĂƐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞDĞƵƐĞŝƐƚŚĞŵĂƐƚĞƌŽĨĞůŐŝƵŵ ? ?24 The central 
triangle between >ŝğŐĞ ?EĂŵƵƌĂŶĚŶƚǁĞƌƉǁĂƐƚŽĨŽƌŵƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ ?ƐŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
operational boundary. Once the first two elements were complete, it was envisaged that units 
engaged on the Meuse would fall back in the face of overwhelming force to join the rest of the army, 
the Government and the Monarchy in a retreat towards Antwerp. Behind the walls of the national 




The most likely source of aid in the event of a Franco-German war remained Britain. Although its 
attitude towards Belgian neutrality was questioned in 1870, the abandonment of isolationism allowed 
for a future continental commitment to be contemplated.25 ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ:ĂƉĂŶĂŶĚŝƚƐ
1904 Entente with France relieved immediate pressure on Imperial matters, allowing for a greater 
concentration on issues closer to home. However, a degree of naivety in British diplomacy drew the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĐůŽƐĞƌŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶǀŽƌƚĞǆ ?ƚŚĂŶǁĂƐƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ?26 More specifically, the creation 
of the Imperial General Staff (IGS) in 1904 paved the way for an Expeditionary Force to be deployed 
in a future continental war. As early as 1905, a strategic war game was played in which this very 
scenario was assessed.27 This signalled the first ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂ ‘ĞůŐŝĂŶKƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂ
British force could foreseeably land and operate out of Oostende or Antwerp. Complications regarding 
Dutch control of the Scheldt meant that French ports were also considered for debarkation.28 Despite 
reservations regarding the ability of the Belgian army to hold the Meuse forts long enough for a British 
intervention to reach the decisive point, operations in Belgium remained desirable. Indeed, the 
Director of Military Operations (DMO), Major-General Sir James Grierson, even told the French 
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƚƚĂĐŚĠŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?DĂũŽƌsŝĐƚŽƌ,ƵŐƵĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?29 These and 
other proposals were placed before the CID for consideration. 
Established in 1902 in the wake of the Second Boer War, the committee, under the 
ƐƚĞǁĂƌĚƐŚŝƉ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WƌŝŵĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ? ǁĂƐ ƚĂƐŬĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĚĞǀŝƐŝŶŐ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? Ɛ Ă
forum for discussion, it provided the new IGS with a platform to present coherent plans for a 
continental commitment. Although opinions varied within the IGS to a greater degree than is 
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ďůƵĞǁĂƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŚŽŽůŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?ĂĚĚĞĚǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇƚŽŝƚƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ?30 
Whereas the army was nominally prepared to entertain the idea of joint-planning, the Royal Navy, 
under the single-minded direction of the Frist Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher, appeared less forthcoming.31  
Naval planners were interested in developing amphibious plans beyond the confines of the CID, but 
ƚŚĞ ƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ĞǀĞƌ-strengthening grip over its decision-making scuppered any hopes of genuine co-
operation. This created a split in strategic thought. A situation arose whereby the CID made decisions 
on specific issues in the 1904-6 period without ever assuming responsibility for joint planning. It failed 
to determine any long-term policy objectives, rather bowing to the increasing influence of the IGS and 
its desire to pursue a strategic ideal, which not only departed significantly from traditional British 
thinking but also entirely eclipsed the scope of the committee.32 As David Morgan-Owen has argued, 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŚĂĚ ƵŶǁŝƚƚŝŶŐůǇ ƐŚŝĨƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ĂǁĂǇ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ
ŵĂƌŝƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ? ?33  
Amidst this atmosphere of uncertainty and internal politicking, Barnardiston was authorised 
by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, and Richard Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War, to 
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make preliminary contact with the Belgian General Staff.34 On 18 January 1906, he met with Ducarne 
in Brussels to discuss the manner and timing of a hypothetical British intervention in the event of a 
war with Germany. These first approaches were as much an opportunity to glean the respective 
strengths and attitudes of the British and Belgian forces as they were to establish a plan of action. 
NeǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝƐŝŽŶĞŵĂŶĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƐŝŵŝůĂƌ
principles. Swift intervention on the Meuse, independence of command, as well as the secrecy and 
unbinding nature of the talks, were paramount. The latter point was particularly important, given the 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞ ƋƵĂŐŵŝƌĞ ŽĨ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞŚĂŶĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĂǀŽŝĚ ĂŶ
irreversible commitment to the Continent on the other.35 This settled, Ducarne obtained permission 
from the MinisteƌŽĨtĂƌ ?'ĞŶĞƌĂůůĞǆĂŶĚƌĞŽƵƐĞďĂŶĚƚĚ ?ůŬĞŵĂĚĞ ?ƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
the bounds of respectability.  
Although very broad, preliminary plans to land the BEF at French ports, with a view to 
transporting them by rail to Antwerp, were established as a working premise. This would allow the 
British to link up with the Belgians in safety and harass the right flank of a possible German sweep 
towards France. However, the exact time and place of a British intervention was dependent upon the 
number of men, horses and material that could be put into the field. Although a BEF was likely to be 
between four and six divisions and one cavalry division, circumstances at home upon the outbreak of 
hostilities was likely to govern the final decision.36 zĞƚ ?,ĂůĚĂŶĞ ?Ɛrestructuring of the army was still on 
the horizon, creating a disconnect between capabilities and policy. As David French has noted, nothing 
was done financially to remedy the obvious limitations in the size of the BEF, despite gross 
overestimations of the role it could realistically be expected to play.37 Lacking a unified strategy and 
ĐůĞĂƌůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ& ?ƐĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚĞůƵƐŝǀĞ ?dŚĞ
question facing the IGS and the Cabinet was whether an independent role in Belgium was a viable 
option, or whether its limitations precluded it from anything more adventurous than operating under 
French command as an extension of their left flank. From a Belgian perspective, direct aid appeared 
probable. The manner and timing ŽĨĂƌŶĂƌĚŝƐƚŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/'^ǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽĂůĞƌƚ
ĞůŐŝƵŵŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƚ ‘ŚĞůĚŝŶƚŚĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƉůĂŶƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁĞƌĞ ?ƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?38 
 Further meetings were arranged on 29 January and 14 February to discuss the possibility of 
joint operations. These envisaged two hypothetical German invasions; one towards Antwerp, and one 
in the direction of the French Ardennes. The former envisioned a minimum German force of five army 
corps, or 200,000 men, attacking towards Antwerp by the seventh day of mobilisation. In this scenario, 
the 100,000 strong Belgian army, whose mobilisation would have been completed by the fourth day, 
would take up a position either: on a line from Neerpelt to Maastricht along the Campine canal, or 
preferably from Turnhout to Diest, which benefitted from excellent defensive terrain. This line could 
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be secured on the second day by the cavalry division, four horse artillery batteries and four cyclist 
companies. This being done, the BEF could be transported to Leuven and Aarschot in support of the 
Belgian right flank in relative safety, as contact with the Germans was not expected to occur before 
the tenth day.39 
 The second option, which might see a German attack along the north bank of the Meuse to 
avoid French troops stationed between Méziers and Sedan, placed a much greater emphasis on speed. 
Crossing the frontier between Eupen and Gouvy on, or after, the eighth day, it was estimated that 
German forces could reach Liège and Namur two days later. To be of any value, the British would need 
to be in position around Namur and Dinant by this time, even were it only in the form of two divisions 
and a cavalry brigade. Based on the approximate numbers provided by Barnardiston, Ducarne 
believed that he could transport the British to their positions in four to five days from the time of 
ĚĞďĂƌŬĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ & ?Ɛ ĂƌƌŝǀĂů ŝŶ &ƌĂŶĐĞ ŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŶŽ ůĂƚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŝǆƚŚ ĚĂǇ ŽĨ
mobilisation. When more detailed figures were passed on by Grierson in late February, Ducarne was 
able tŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞŵĞƚŝĐƵůŽƵƐƚŝŵĞƚĂďůĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ& ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĂůƚŽĞůŐŝƵŵĨƌŽŵĂůĂŝƐ ?ŽƵůŽŐŶĞĂŶĚ
Cherbourg.40 Conversations continued throughout March in which further details were refined. 
ƵĐĂƌŶĞ ?ƐǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶƵƚŝĂĞďĞƚƌĂǇĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽǀĞr the ability of his army. Despite 
realising that nothing discussed was binding, his letter to the Belgian Minister of War reflected the 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ŽĨ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ĂŝĚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŝƚ ďĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?  ‘dŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ
favourable, can only be ŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶƚĂŶĚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐĂĐƚŝŽŶďǇĂůůŝĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?ŚĞ
ǁƌŽƚĞ ? ‘ǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŐƌĂǀĞĞƌƌŽƌŝĨƚŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƌĚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐĞ ?ŽůŽŶĞůĂƌŶĂƌĚŝƐƚŽŶ
ĂƐƐƵƌĞĚŵĞƚŚĂƚĂůůǁŽƵůĚďĞĚŽŶĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĞŶĚ ? ?41  
 The cordiality with which the conversations were pursued by both sides, equally lends weight 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ?should it ever transpire, was to 
ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?:ŽŚŶdǇůĞƌƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĞůŐŝĂŶKƉƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽŶůǇƉůĂŶ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŚŝƐŵĂĚĞŶŽ
reference to an alignment with the French.42 Notwithstanding, conversations with the French General 
Staff were also underway, though the extent to which joint-planning went beyond the briefest 
suggestion of a BEF linking-up with the French left flank in no way matched Anglo-Belgian planning in 
1906.43 ĞƐƉŝƚĞ,ƵŐƵĞƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ? ƚŽĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŚŝƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŶǆŝĞƚŝĞƐŽǀĞƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
attitude in a future Franco-German war to Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington, The Times ?
military correspondent, close co-operation appeared beset with obstacles.44 Chief among these were 
concerns that a British force would be subjugated to French command the moment it landed and used 
inappropriately as a result.45 dŚŝƐƐĂƚƵŶĞĂƐŝůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ/'^ ?ǁŚŽƐĞŽǁŶ ‘t ?ŝƚŚ ?& ?ƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞǁĂƐ
later drafted without the knowledge and input of the French military authorities.46   
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Irrespectively, the Anglo-Belgian conversations of 1906 did not significantly alter the individual plans 
being devised by European General Staffs at this stage. Germany, France and Britain continued to 
develop their own schemes  W albeit with Belgium in mind. It had become clearer that Belgium was 
prepaƌĞĚƚŽƵƉŚŽůĚŝƚƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŝƚƐůĂĐŬŽĨƐƵŝƚĂďůĞŵĞĂŶƐ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞ
an independent role in a future continental war clearly pushed it towards closer co-operation with the 
Belgians than the French in early 1906. However, the ensuing détente after the Algeciras Conference 
shifted the focus of joint-planning. Barnardiston left his post as military attaché to Brussels in May, 
which severed official communication. While Britain took stock of the European situation, the Belgian 
General Staff was left confused by the sudden withdrawal. No talks had been held with either the 
French or Germans in this regard, which rather left the kingdom as isolated in its neutrality as it had 
ďĞĞŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǇĞĂƌ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƵĐĂƌŶĞ ?ƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚ'ƌŝĞƌƐŽŶĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƌŵǇ ?ƐŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞƐ
ŝŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
would allow for as many as 150,000 troops to be sent to Belgium, it remained unclear as to whether 
the desire to do so remained.47 
IV 
The period 1906-12 was truly one of détente in Anglo-Belgian relations. Diplomatic shots fired over 
the Congo Free State did little to promote a feeling of goodwill after the disappointment of 1906. 
Tensions between the two countries had ƌƵŶ ŚŝŐŚ ƐŝŶĐĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ďƵƚ ĚŵƵŶĚ DŽƌĞů ?Ɛ ƌĞǀĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
ĂďƵƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƚŽ Ă ŚĞĂĚ ? /ƚ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ
ƉŚŝůĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŝĐ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ <ŝŶŐ >ĞŽƉŽůĚ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ŚĂĚ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ? ? ƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ Congo 
venture to be no more than a financial boon and a means to redirect internal partisan divisions 
towards territorial and economic expansion abroad.48 After a public campaign, which evoked the 
memory of nineteenth century anti-slavery, the House of Commons was forced to take note and lend 
its support to the growing movement of denunciators in May 1903.49 dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
clarified by Grey in 1906, who called for Belgian annexation as a precursor to reform. This received 
the support of the United States, whose sensibilities had been roused by the internalisation of the 
issue, and who, in January 1908, called for a joint démarche.50 Despite the torrent of international 
pressure, the mantle of a colonial power sat uneasily with a Belgian public, fearful of increased 
taxation.51 Notwithstanding, the decision was taken out of its hands when annexation was confirmed 
later that year. Although it was a step in the right direction from an international perspective, King 
Leopold II harboured particular disdain towards the foreign governments that had forced his hand in 
the matter.52 It was the first of many incidents that strained relations between himself and the British, 
which ultimately negatively impacted renewed attempts at Anglo-Belgian military co-operation. 
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The situatioŶ ǁŽƌƐĞŶĞĚ ǁŚĞŶ ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƚĂŬĞŶ Ă ůĞĂĨ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
Transvaal in 1900, King Leopold II decided that Belgium was not obliged to officially inform the other 
Powers of the annexation. This ran contrary to British opinion, which believed that the Berlin Act 
compelled Belgium to do so.53 As a result, neither Britain, nor the United States, consented to 
recognising the annexation until evidence of sustainable reforms was provided by the new regime. 
For Grey, this was the limit of the pressure Britain was prepared to exert on Belgium. There was a real 
fear that the Congo, due to its strategic position between German and French possessions, might fall 
under the wrong sphere of influence were Brussels pushed too far on the matter.54 Yet, reformers 
continued to campaign for more. Sir Charles Dilke, speaking to the House of Commons, for example, 
questioned why the government was spending such huge sums of money on military reorganisation 
when no war was imminent, rather than using it to support British diplomacy in the Congo question.55 
Morel, too, accused Grey of sacrificing the Congo to the demands of the Entente and the secret 
military conversations.56 This was only partly true, for the army was in need of reform following the 
organisational problems laid bare by the Second Boer War.57 Nevertheless, the development of Anglo-
French preparations for the commitment of an Expeditionary Force to the Continent was predicated 
on maintaining cordial relations with Brussels, which now appeared more responsive towards Berlin. 
The once fraught relationship between Belgium and Germany was on the mend. Not only had 
Kaiser Wilhelm II been among the first to congratulate Belgium on its annexation of the Congo, but 
the timely death of King Leopold II in December 1909, removed any lasting animosity between the 
two royal families. This dated back to a meeting in 1904 at which the Kaiser had put out feelers to the 
<ŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞůŐŝĂŶƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚĂĐŝƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŝŶ Ă ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ǁĂƌ ŝŶ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ĨŽƌ Ă  ‘ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ŬŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?
incorporating French Flanders as well as the Duchy of Bourgogne.58 The accession of King Albert I, a 
suspected Germanophile through his upbringing and education, alerted the Entente to the potential 
dangers of an unwarranted renewal of friendship. Admiration for the Prussian military system among 
Belgian officers had been noted by French military attachés for years, but the replacement of Ducarne 
with the German-ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝƐŝŶŐ'ĞŶĞƌĂů,ĂƌƌǇ:ƵŶŐďůƵƚŚ ?<ŝŶŐůďĞƌƚ/ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƚƵƚŽƌĂŶĚůĂƚĞƌ,ĞĂĚ
of the Royal Household) was indicative of a much wider shift in attitude. According to the British 
military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Bridges, this went as high up as the Minister of War, General 
Joseph Hellebaut.59 
<ŝŶŐ ůďĞƌƚ / ?Ɛ ǀŝƐŝƚ ƚŽWŽƚƐĚĂŵĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ ŽĨDĂǇ  ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐ Ă mark of renewed cordiality 
between Belgium and Germany. Every effort was made to allow the Belgian press access to the pre-
arranged activities of the royal couple, which included, among other things, military reviews and gala 




ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? ?60 This, he repeated in October when welcoming the Kaiser to Brussels, much to the 
consternation of the assembled crowd.61 Although Kaiser Wilhelm II was incapacitated for the majority 
ŽĨƚŚĞĞůŐŝĂŶƌŽǇĂůǀŝƐŝƚ ?ƚŚĞ<ƌŽŶƉƌŝŶǌĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚĂƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶŚŝƐĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŶĂŵĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ
historic links between the two families and nations. In particular, the overcoming of difficult 
negotiations regarding the border disputes between the Congo and German East Africa were cited as 
proof of a mutual desire to find common ground upon which to develop this relationship.62  
No clearer evidence of this was given than at the 1910 Brussels Exhibition in which German 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŽĚŶĞǆƚƚŽ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶŝĞů>ĂƋƵĂŚĂƐƐŚŽǁŶ
how World Fairs were key events in the mechanics of internationalism, which broadcast Belgium as a 
meeting place to celebrate global enterprise, as well as to promote unity and peace.63 The visibility of 
such co-operation did not go unnoticed. Burgeoning economic ties, which had attracted some 40,000 
Germans to Antwerp, were viewed in somĞƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐĂƐ ‘ƉĂĐŝĨŝĐƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ ?ǁŽƌƐĞƐƚŝůů ?ĂƐĂ ‘ƉƌĞ-
ĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚ ? ?64 Clearly, the influence of Gurson (later Krupp) in the redevelopment of the Meuse and 
Antwerp fortifications only added to French fears. 65 Although contracts were also given to the French 
arms manufacturer Saint-Chamond, the relationship lacked the warmth of reciprocity enjoyed 
between Belgian and German exchanges. This was likely the result of the general suspicion with which 
the Catholic Government and populace viewed the anti-cleriĐĂůŝƐŵŽĨ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶůƵƌĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ
Left.66   
 From a British perspective, the Belgo-German rapprochement over the Congo was a 
potentially seismic paradigm shift in terms of military planning. Were Brussels to sanction the passage 
of German troops through its south-eastern corner, the strategic disadvantages this posed to the 
Entente would be irretrievable. Even token resistance, which might allow Belgium to save face on the 
international stage without compromising its position vis-à-ǀŝƐŝƚƐ  ‘ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌ ? ?ǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞŵƵĐŚ
the same outcome  W albeit retaining the pretence of neutrality and safeguarding independence.67 
Indeed, it was often mooted in British circles that Belgium would now simply avoid committing itself 
to either side in a war until it could make certain of joining the victors.68 The appearance of a 1911 
pamphlet by Lieutenant-General Léon de Witte, under the pseudonym O. Dax, suggesting that 
Belgium owed its first obligation to itself rather than the laws governing its neutrality, heightened 
suspicions.69 Although it was swiftly withdrawn from circulation, the effect of such a publication 
reinforced Entente views that a once-friendly Belgium was at risk of becoming a strategic liability.70  
 Anglo-French planning had developed substantially in the years 1906-08 to the point where 
ƚŚĞ ‘t&^ĐŚĞŵĞ ?ƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ action.71 The IGS, who had been encouraged to 




 ‘ ? ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞŶƚĞŶƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ'ƌĞĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞŽĨǀĂůƵĞƐŽůŽŶŐĂƐŝƚƌĞƐƚƐƵƉŽŶĂŶ
understanding that, in the event of a war in which both are involved alike on land and sea, the whole 
of the available naval and military strength of the two countries will be brought to bear at the decisive 
point. [The Expeditionary Force] could be more effectively used as a reinforcement to the French left 
than in co-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞĂďƌŽŬĞŶŽƌĚŝƐƉŝƌŝƚĞĚĞůŐŝĂŶĂƌŵǇ ? ?72 
 
Similar conclusions were drawn from a 1910 IGS war game exercise, demonstrating a 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƐŚŝĨƚ ŝŶ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞntal policy to accommodate France rather than 
Belgium.73 dŚŝƐǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ^ŝƌ,ĞŶƌǇtŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ&ƌĂŶĐŽƉŚŝůĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚƌĞǁƌŝƚĂŝŶĐůŽƐĞƌ
into the Entente. Nevertheless, certain quarters of the IGS continued to champion the inherent 
benefits of landing in Belgium, were information concerning its preparedness and attitude obtainable. 
After all, the importance of denying Belgium to Germany remained paramount but would require swift 
and decisive action to avoid committing the BEF to the support of an already beaten and demoralised 
force.74 ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐ ?ŽƌĂĨƵůůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ
course of action could, however, be decided when the situation arose. A 1907 report had revealed 
that the timetables drĂǁŶƵƉďǇƵĐĂƌŶĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĐŽƵůĚĞƋƵĂůůǇƐĞƌǀĞĂƐƚŚĞ& ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚƚŽĞůŐŝƵŵ
or to its positions in France.75 dŚŝƐǁĂƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ,ĞŶƌǇƐƋƵŝƚŚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞ ?ŝŶ
KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽƐĞĞ ‘ƚŚĞĞůŐŝĂŶƉůĂŶ ?ǁŽƌŬĞĚŽƵƚĞǆĂĐůǇĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉůĂŶ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĞǀĞŶ
if political considerations meant that military co-operation appeared unlikely.76 
 In France, too, the Dax pamphlet caused planners to take more serious note of Belgium than 
had previously been thought necessary. General Joseph Joffre recorded in his memoirs how it 
ĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚ Ă ƌĞŶĞǁĞĚ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ŽƵƚ ŵŽƌĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ŝƚƐ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?
particularly the Meuse fortifications and their potential to delay a German advance.77 Wilson had 
managed to define French conceptions of a German sweep through Belgium by 1911, which predicted 
a force of 40 divisions overwhelming Liège and Namur before rolling into France.78 This was clearly an 
issue for Joffre, whose predecessors had not placed enough stock by reports of German railroad 
construction on the Belgian border, nor considered the nature of the threat posed by an unopposed 
ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞDĞƵƐĞďĂƐŝŶ ?dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ‘ďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ ?ŝŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ŽƵŐůĂƐ
WŽƌĐŚŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚ ?ƉƵƐŚĞĚ:ŽĨĨƌĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨWůan XVI towards a high-risk, offensive strategy that 
ƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ‘ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŽďƚĂŝŶĂŶĞĂƌůǇĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?79 With both the 
 ‘ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ǁĞůů-ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĚ ďǇ  ? ? ? ? ? :ŽĨĨƌĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
power at the head of the army allowed him to develop the tactical doctrine of the offensive à outrance 
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on a strategic level. To this end, France would have the greatest interest in taking the offensive 
through Belgium first, but diplomatic practicalities proved restrictive.  
 ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŝŵƉŽƐĞĚďǇĞůŐŝĂŶŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ?:ŽĨĨƌĞ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĨŽƌĂƉƌĞ-
emptive advance across the border were rejected because of British sensibilities. Although uncertainty 
ĂďŽƵŶĚĞĚĂƐƚŽĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŽďvious that it would never countenance such a measure 
and would likely withdraw the support of the BEF, which had become increasingly prominent in the 
revision of French plans.80 Aware of this, Joffre again approached the Superior Council of National 
Defence with a proposal to launch an offensive through Belgium immediately upon hearing of a 
German transgression. This was approved in principle, but the matter did not rest there. The rewards 
for pre-emptive action were too great to be so easily dismissed, resulting in further suggestions by 
Théophile Delcassé, the French Naval Minister, that, since Belgian neutrality had been contrived by 
the British at the expense of France in 1839, perhaps London might be induced to drop its scruples 
over it to bolster Entente relations.81 dŚŝƐǁĂƐ ĨůĂƚůǇ ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĂƐǁĂƐ :ŽĨĨƌĞ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƐƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůŽŶ  ? ?
&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?ŽĨŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ǁŝƚŚ>ŽŶĚŽŶĂŶĚƌƵƐƐĞůƐĂŚĞĂĚŽĨĂ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƚƚĂĐŬ ?
Mutual Anglo-Belgian suspicion following the Congo question precluded such an advance, while it 
would merely have reinforced the already established fears within Belgium that Entente planning 
cared little for its sovereignty. However, because it offered a greater chance of success than an 
offensive through Lorraine  W with the added benefit of greater British participation, too  W France had 
to seriously consider whether it was worth violating Belgian neutrality rather than accept battle on 
less favourable terms.82 The French President, Raymond Poincaré, used his executive power to hold 
JoĨĨƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƌŵǇŝŶĐŚĞĐŬ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞĚŝĚŵĂŬĞŝŶƋƵŝƌŝĞƐŝŶƚŽƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶĞůŐŝƵŵ ?83 
 dŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘&ƌĂŶĐĞŵŝŐŚƚďĞĐŽŵƉĞůůĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?ĂƐWĂƵůĂŵďŽŶŶŽƚĞĚ ?
concerned the British, though Grey refused to be drawn on the matter.84 The Second Moroccan Crisis 
in April 1911 had certainly rendered the matter more urgent, but opinion remained split within the 
/ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐǇĞƚƚŽĐŽŵĞƚŽƚĞƌŵƐǁŝƚŚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŵŽƌĂů ?
commitment to France. In a letter to Grey, dated 30 August 1911, Winston Churchill, then First Lord 
of the Admiralty, expressed his forthright views on the matter in the following terms: 
 
 ‘WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŵŝŶŐ ǁŚĞŶ ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝůů ďĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?WůĞĂƐĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞfollowing 
policy for us if and when the Morocco negotiations fail. Propose to France and Russia a triple alliance 
to safeguard (inter alia) the independence of Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. Tell Belgium that, if her 
neutrality is violated, we are prepared to come to her aid and to make an alliance with France and 
Russia to guarantee her independence. Tell her that we will take whatever military steps will be most 
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effective for that purpose. But the Belgian Army must take the field in concert with the British and 
French Armies, and Belgium must immediately garrison Liège and Namur. Otherwise we cannot be 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌŚĞƌĨĂƚĞ ? ? Q ?tĞƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ĂŝĚĞůŐŝƵŵƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚŶƚǁĞƌƉĂŶĚƚŽĨĞĞĚƚŚĂƚ
fortress and any army based on it. We should be prepared at the proper moment to put extreme 
pressure on the Dutch to keep the Scheldt open for all purposes. If the Dutch close the Scheldt, we 
ƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚĞďǇĂďůŽĐŬĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞZŚŝŶĞ ? ?85 
 
Although brash, and not necessarily reflective of official policy, it raises a number of points 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ &ƌĞŶĐŚ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ŝŶ ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇǁĂƐŝŶǀŝŽůĂďůĞ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐƐƚŝůůĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞ
action in Belgium. And thirdly, that intervention was entirely predicated on the unknown attitudes of 
the neutral nations.  
 The Dutch had emerged as a particular thorn to the Belgian Option. In 1910, under suspected 
German pressure, The Hague sanctioned the costly redevelopment of the fortification of Flushing, 
which commanded entry to the Scheldt estuary.86 Despite clearly aimed at denying British access to 
Antwerp, the Dutch insisted that this was not a provocation; it was merely ensuring that Flushing 
would not fall into a belligereŶƚ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚŶŽůĞŐĂůŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞƐƚ ?ďƵƚĐŽŶ ĞƌŶƐǁĞƌĞ
voiced at the CID in April 1911 when two aspects of British planning were considered to be affected. 
dŚĞƐĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂǁĂƌďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞritish and German 
Empires; and, secondly, their particular effect on the strategical conditions of warlike operations 
ǁŚŝĐŚŵŝŐŚƚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ ?ŝŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨĞůŐŝĂŶŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?87 The latter was only an 
issue if Antwerp were to be used as a British base of operations  W something yet to be decided upon 
 W but the former implied a genuine concern over German use of Dutch territory in the event of war, 
which would significantly alter the strategic paradigm. Quite obviously, this was untrue, not least 
because alterations to the Schlieffen Plan by the Younger Moltke had removed the possibility of a 
violation of Dutch territory.88 Nevertheless, Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister to Belgium, was 
moved to accidentally intimate to Brussels in 1910 that construction of the fort might alter British 
plans to the point of necessitating a pre-emptive occupation of Antwerp.89 Flushing had awakened the 
Belgian public to the possibility of a German invasion, but such intimations from a supposedly friendly 
Guarantor were not well received.90 When this was followed-ƵƉǁŝƚŚĂƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŽĨ ‘ƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂĨƚĞƌ tŝůƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƌŝĚŐĞƐ ? ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ :ƵŶŐďůƵƚŚ ŝŶ ĞĂƌůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ďĞŐĂŶ ƚŽ
seriously question Entente intentions.91 ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĂůůĞviate Belgian anxieties at this juncture, 
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was just another diplomatic faux pas in a mismanaged situation that saw tensions escalate at a time 
when Entente plans depended upon a stable and amenable Belgium. 
 According to David Stevenson, both the Belgian and Dutch responses to the Second Moroccan 
Crisis informed all observers of the benefits they offered the Triple Entente. In anticipation of a Franco-
German war, both countries cancelled their 1911 manoeuvres and retained classes of soldiers due for 
release. In Belgium, the fortresses were reinforced and the frontier bridges manned and primed for 
demolition, while three classes of reservists were on the point of recall before the dispute was 
settled.92 Yet, it was clearly not that evident to the British, whose response to Agadir was to seek 
further assurances of Belgian intentions through the resumption of staff talks.93 The subtext, however, 
was concern over a shift in the nature of Anglo-&ƌĞŶĐŚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĂǁƚŚĞ& ?ƐƌŽůĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ
significantly. This was borne out of the rise of the offensive à outrance school within the French army, 
ǁŚŝĐŚƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞ& ?ƐƌŽůĞĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨĂƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĨŽƌĐĞƚŽĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌ:ŽĨĨƌĞ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ? tŝůƐŽŶ ǁĂƐ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ǁĂƌǇ ŽĨ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ & ?Ɛ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐe of action, which 
included the option of advancing into Belgium should the situation arise. This was something the 
French were unwilling to seriously consider.94  
KƵƚŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ& ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?tŝůƐŽŶďĞŐĂŶƚŽǀŝŐŽƌŽƵƐůǇƌĞ-explore 
the Belgian option. After a cycling tour along the Franco-Belgian border in October 1911, Wilson 
returned to Britain to lobby the likes of Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, and Sir John French, the Chief of the IGS, to lay the groundwork for a resumption of military 
conversations.95 tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ& ?ĂƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƵůĚůĂŶĚŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐĞďĞĨŽƌĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ
in conjunction with the Belgian army on the flank of a German advance. Crucially, however, its base 
of operations would remain in France on account of the uncertainty regarding Dutch permission to 
use the Scheldt and a desire to retain contact with the French army.96 It was on this basis that Bridges 
approached Jungbluth to reopen negotiations in April 1912.97 Little did he know how much Belgian 
attitudes had evolved. 
V 
A number of factors had converged in the recent past to engender a reinterpretation of Belgian 
neutrality by its Foreign Ministry. Not only had Belgium emerged from the annexation of the Congo 
as a European power of note, but it had awoken to the probability of invasion and had responded with 
the first of a series of military reforms designed to act as a deterrent. The dynamics of decision-making 
had shifted since 1906 and gave Belgium a renewed confidence to stand up for its rights as a sovereign 
state capable and determined to formulate its own defence policy. The Entente, and France in 
particular, had given Léon Arendt, the Political Director at the Belgian Foreign Ministry, enough cause 
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for suspicion over the past few years to conclude that an invasion was equally as likely to emanate 
from its side as it was from Germany. Apart from the diplomatic tensions surrounding the annexation 
of the Congo, reports of French officers on reconnaissance missions on Belgian soil only added weight 
to the rumours of pre-emptive action.98 As such, Belgium adopted a policy of dissuasion towards its 
Guarantors. All were likely aggressors and all were to receive the same response the Belgian Prime 
Minister, Charles de Broqueville, was reported to have given to his French counterpart, Joseph 
Caillaux, on 7 September 1911  W namely that Belgium could put 200,000 men into the field on a war 
footing to meet any invasion. The caveat was that Belgium could not be expected to meet all incursions 
into its territory at its frontiers.99 
What was meant by this was articulated in a November 1911 report by Arendt entitled: In the 
Event of War, What Shall We Do? This document summarised recent soundings taken from officials at 
the Foreign Ministry, War Ministry and Council of Ministers, and acted as a working premise for 
Belgian policy in the likely event of an invasion. It was predicated on the likelihood of a German 
ŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ ƐŽƵƚŚ-eastern corner, but could not exclude the possibility that France 
might simultaneously cross the border to meet the invading force. In such a scenario, the 
outnumbered Belgian army, it was argued, would not be compelled under the terms of its neutrality 
to join the fray and risk its, and tŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ?ǀĞƌǇĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƚĐŽƵůĚĂĚŽƉƚĂŵŽƌĞƌĞƐ ƌǀĞĚ
approach to contain the fighting and safeguard the rest of the neutralised zone.100 This bold and 
pragmatic interpretation of its obligations was predicated on the principle that neutrality was but a 
tool to guarantee independence and did not demand the sacrifice of its defensive capabilities for the 
sake of a principle that would instantly be rendered redundant. Were there to be a clear violation by 
one army or another, Belgium would naturally act against it, as was its duty. However, getting caught 
up in the maelstrom of a mass, continental struggle against all sides was evidently not an option. 
Instead, Belgium was to act within the bounds of neutrality and execute it to the best of its 
abiůŝƚǇ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞdƌĞĂƚǇ ?ƌĞŶĚƚĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĞůŐŝƵŵ ? ‘ ?Ă ?ƐĂƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?ŚĂĚ ?ĂƌŝŐŚƚĂŶĚĂĚƵƚǇƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞŝƚƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐĂƐŝƚƉůĞĂƐĞ ?Ě ? ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?101 
Consequently, aid by a Guarantor force, which had previously been a given, was now not deemed a 
pre-requisite to withstanding an invasion. In fact, aid was contingent on a Belgian request and could 
only be invoked by a Guarantor under the Treaty were Belgium deemed unable to defend itself after 
it had been attacked.102 This prohibited a Guarantor, irrespective of intentions, from undertaking pre-
emptive action. Were a Guarantor force to arrive, Belgium was under no obligation to become an ally 
and would in fact be required to conclude a special convention to define the object and extent of that 
aid in order to safeguard its sovereignty and independence of action. In most hypotheses of a German 
invasion put forward by the General Staff, the prospect of accepting aid was factored into its 
 17 
 
calculations. Joint-action on the Meuse seemed logical, but under no circumstances was a Guarantor 
force to be given access to its fortifications. Were this to become a sticking point, the General Staff 
ǁĂƐĂĚĂŵĂŶƚƚŚĂƚĂŝĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĨƵƐĞĚ ?dŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ƵŶĂŶŝmous in subordinating, 
ŝŶ Ăůů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ĚƵƚŝĞƐ ? ŝŶ Ă ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƉƌĞŵĞ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?103 The question was how to satisfactorily align these interests with 
its international obligations. 
The problem with accepting aid at all, however, was significantly more complicated than it 
had been in the past. In 1870, Belgium had been able to rely on a neutral Britain to intervene on its 
behalf and prevent the Franco-Prussian War from spilling across its borders. The Entente Cordiale now 
rendered this unlikely in the event of a French invasion. However, in the ever more likely event of a 
ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ‘ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ?ŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶďǇĂ'ƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ&ƌĂŶĐĞŽƌ
Britain, public opinion would not countenance action against what would be perceived as a relieving 
force.104 Yet, in contrast to what was being discussed in 1906, this might well take the form of 
unwarranted pre-emptive action. Reflecting on this, Arendt concluded,  
 
 ‘ůƚŽŐĞther, the assistance of a Guarantor, as inevitable as it is, presents great perils and its advantages 
are, more or less, nil. Once our neutrality is violated by an attempted passage of an entire army, 
Belgian territory will become and remain the theatre of war. The assistance of the other belligerent 
[Britain] will not, it must be feared, have any other effect than to extend the battlefield across our 
ƐŽŝů ? ?105 
 
In this instance, what good would assistance be? It would only compromise Belgium vis-à-vis 
the invading army, which would have no wish to fight as it passed through the country to reach its 
actual enemy. Even were aid accepted and victory obtained, the Guarantor would use its weight to 
impose an unfavourable political or military situation on Belgium to ensure its territory would never 
ĂŐĂŝŶďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐĂƌŽƵƚĞŽĨ ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ? /ŶƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵŚĂĚĂƌŝŐŚƚĂŶĚĚƵƚǇƵŶƚŽ ŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽ
remain as aloof as possible and not to make enemies. The best case scenario would be that, at the 
first transgression by an army, its adversary would move to meet it, leaving the Belgian army free to 
not take sides but merely act to contain the invasion.106 In this sense, the Dax pamphlet was not far 
wide of the mark. 
 Yet, the reality of the situation would likely be more complicated. This was not least because 
a Guarantor might seek to arrange for Belgium to enter a future war on its side. The massing of enemy 
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troops on the frontiers might be used as a reason to invoke the Treaty due to the evident intention of 
the other belligerent to attack. London was viewed as the most likely culprit. The details of the Entente 
Cordiale were unknown to the Belgians, but it was likely that a German invasion of the neutral zone 
would give it the cause and means to send a force to the Continent; ideally via Antwerp. Britain had 
always considered itself the guardian of Belgian integrity.107 However, there were accompanying 
suspicions that its interests lay primarily in Antwerp and that a pre-emptive landing there was a 
distinct possibility. Antwerp would provide the BEF with a base from which to operate against a 
German envelopment. The fear, in Belgium, was that pre-emptive Entente action would give the 
German army an immediate pretext to cross the frontier but, this time, without cause to restrict its 
operations to the south-ĞĂƐƚĞƌŶĐŽƌŶĞƌ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƌĞŶĚƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůǇŝŶĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ
interest to dissuade and resist any pre-emptive moves by its Guarantors. However, this would need 
to be followed up by a show of arms to demonstrate Belgian willingness to defend its neutrality against 
whichever belligerent deigned to violate it first. Thus, when Bridges met with Jungbluth to reopen 
military conversations on 23 April 1912, the diplomatic climate had evolved significantly. Belgium no 
longer saw much advantage to military co-operation unless it was on its terms and after a violation. 
More to the point, Belgian officials were highly sceptical of Entente machinations. 
At the first meeting the two men discussed the means by which a British intervention could 
ďĞƐƚŚĞůƉĞůŐŝƵŵƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ ? ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŚĂƐ ŝŶǀĂĚĞĚĞůŐŝƵŵ W ǁŚĂƚƐŚĂůůǁĞĚŽ ? ?ŵŽŶŐ
other things, Bridges inquired as to the feasibility of British landings at Oostende, Zeebrugge and 
Antwerp.108 He was authorised to suggest that a possible British force of 160,000 men, consisting of 
six infantry divisions and eight cavalry brigades, would be available for intervention. As the 
ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ƌŝĚŐĞƐƌĞĐĂůůĞĚŝŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ‘KŶŽŶĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ/ǁĂƐĂƐŬĞĚǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚ
be GreĂƚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ŝĨ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ŝŶǀĂĚĞĚ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ĂŶĚ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĂƉƉĞĂů ĨŽƌ ŚĞůƉ ? ? dŚĞ
ĂƚƚĂĐŚĠƌĞƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂĚŶŽĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽƐĂǇďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?ŚĞ ?ĨĞůƚƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
would regard intervention under the terms of the Treaty as not only a duty but a right. At the same 
time [he] added, an appeal for help from Belgium would enormously strengthen the hand of [the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ďǇ ƌŽƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?109 Further damage was done when 
Bridges revealed that it was generally assumed that the Belgian army would be incapable, even if it 
did fight, to halt a German advance, therefore necessitating British aid at the decisive point and time 
to have any serious effect. This may well have been the case militarily, but Belgian sovereignty was at 
ƐƚĂŬĞ ?'ƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌŽƌŶŽƚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚŶŽƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ŵŽǀĞŝŶƚŽĞůŐŝƵŵĂŶĚĞǆƉĞů'ĞƌŵĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐ
ĨƌŽŵĞůŐŝĂŶƐŽŝů ? ?ĂƐǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƉƌŝŽƌĐ ŶƐĞŶƚ ?110 Indeed, any unwarranted Entente 
incursion would have been no different to the German invasion it sought to counter. 
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This was the turning point in the conversations. Belgian officials were outraged, and Jungbluth 
made it perfectly clear that any pre-emptive British landing would be seen as a violation, whilst he 
flatly rejected the view that his forces were incapable of chequing a German advance. The Belgian 
army had been significantly reformed in recent years, removing many of the vices that had previously 
concerned foreign observers. Moreover, ample provision for defending the most likely route of attack 
through Belgian Luxembourg had been made in response to intelligence received concerning German 
preparations in the Eifel region.111 ƌŝĚŐĞƐ ? ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŽ ĂŵƉůŝĨǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
Entente ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ had resulted in the drawing-up of plans involving Belgium 
without its consent under the pretext of guaranteeing neutrality.112 Jungbluth had already alerted 
Bridges in September 1911 that France, not Germany, was seen as the most likely aggressor, stating: 
 ‘dŽƐĂǇŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇǁĂƐƐŽďĂĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
fact, coupled with bad harvests, drought, and general depression, would make a war most impolitic 
for her. France, on the other hand, was richer than ever, and public opinion firm. The French press 
was a dangerous factor in the situation, and it must not be forgotten that a Frenchman was capable 
ŽĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?113 Further credence was added in late 1912 when French military preparations on its 
northern border were stepped up and accompanied by an approach to ascertain Belgian attitudes 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶ ‘ĞŶƚĞŶƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ'ƵĂƌĂŶƚŽƌWŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ'ƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?114 This could only mean 
one thing, and Belgium was now confident enough in its own sovereignty to reject it outright. 
&ƌŽŵĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ ?ƚŚĞƚĂůŬƐǁĞƌĞĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚŝƚƐǁŽƌƐƚĨĞĂƌƐŽĨ
becoming isolated in the midst of European politics in the post-ŐĂĚŝƌǁŽƌůĚ ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛrapprochement 
with France in the preceding years meant that it could no longer be dealt with as a detached, 
uncommitted, benevolent power.115 From the Entente ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ŽǀĞƌ
Belgian intentions prevented it from formulating a coherent and definitive plan of action in the event 
of a German invasion. Recognition of the Congo and reassurances following the Bridges affair were 
not forthcoming and displayed an underestimation of Belgian sensibilities towards the international 
situation. Indeed, it took until April 1913 for Grey to hear of the Bridges debacle through the Count de 
Lalaing, the Belgian ambassador to London. The Foreign Secretary immediately wrote to Sir Francis 
Villiers, the British ambassador to Brussels, asking him to appease any lingering fears of British mal 
intentions.116 On his side, GƌĞǇ ƐƉŽŬĞ ƚŽĚĞ>ĂůĂŝŶŐŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞďŝǌĂƌƌĞŶŽƚŝŽŶǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚ
ǀŝŽůĂƚĞǇŽƵƌŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇũƵƐƚĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŽƌ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ? ?,ĞĂĚĚĞĚ ? ‘/ĐĂŶĂƐƐƵƌĞǇŽƵƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?
at least under the current Liberal Government, could never be brought to do such a thing. On the 
contrary, we have but one thought and that is to protect neutrals. I think that this strange suspicion 
of British intentions must have been submitted to the Belgian public by the Germans, who perhaps 
ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ŝƚ ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ? ?117 When told that it was British officers who had planted such 
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ŶŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?'ƌĞǇƌĞƉůŝĞĚǁŝƚŚ ? ‘tĞůůƚŚĞŶ ?ŶĞǀĞƌǁŽƵůĚǁĞƉƌĞ-emptively send our troops into Belgium 
ďĞĨŽƌĞǇŽƵƌŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶǀŝŽůĂƚĞĚ ?zŽƵĐĂŶďĞƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĂƚ ? ?118 Unfortunately, the moment had 
already passed. Belgian preparations for war developed under the assumption that they were very 
ŵƵĐŚ ĂůŽŶĞ ? Ɛ ĞǇĞŶƐ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?  ‘EŽ ŵŽƌĞ ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ƚŚĂŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ŶĞǀĞƌ
concluded, nor even discussed, a convention between Belgium and England, or between Belgium and 
&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŶĞǀĞƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƵƐŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂŝĚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨŽƵƌŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?119 
VI 
 Throughout the entire period under consideration, the Great Powers paid special attention to 
Belgium without fully acknowledging the agency it possessed to develop its own plans independently 
of theirs. An inability to comprehend this fact led to a situation whereby few were convinced of the 
attitude it would adopt when confronted by war. Eyre Crowe, with characteristic foresight, predicted 
that Belgium would resist a German invasion upon the outbreak of hostilities  W but this seemed far 
from certain after 1912.120 Despite significant organisational developments, including the introduction 
of universal conscription in May 1913, few believed the Belgian army capable of more than token 
resistance. Yet its field army, which was due to swell to an unprecedented 340,000 by 1925, could 
mobilise quicker than its adversaries and adopt positions in support of the fortress system to ward off 
a transgressor. Indeed, of the fourteen staff rides conducted between 1897 and 1913, officers 
examined the possibilities of repulsing a French invasion seven times, a German invasion six times, 
and a British invasion once.121 Although not necessarily indicative of war planning, these scenarios still 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚŝĐĐůŝŵĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚĂŶĚĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽŝƚƐŽǁŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?
 However, a defined diplomatic response to an invasion and a restructuring of the army did 
not necessarily translate to a coherent operational plan. Not only were fissures opened when the 
General Staff wrested significant powers away from the Ministry of War in 1911, with the 
establishment of the Superior Council of National Defence in 1911, but also continuity of thought was 
frequently disrupted by the high turnover of senior officers in the years preceding the outbreak of 
ǁĂƌ ? &ŝǀĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ĞůĞǀĞŶ >ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚ-Generals were due to retire before the end of 1912.122 
Among them was Jungbluth, who had taken over as Chief of the General Staff aged 63 in 1910. This 
precipitated a crisis of command, not least because the nomination of Major-General Dufour to 
succeed him was challenged by two officers on the grounds of seniority. Both Lieutenant-General De 
Ceuninck and Major-'ĞŶĞƌĂůd ?^ĞƌĐůĂĞƐƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŝŐŶƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚĞǇďĞŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚ ?123 The delay 
in confirming the nomination caused friction because it opened the Catholic Government up to 
accusations from the Left that Dufour was being denied the post on account of his anticlerical views 
and his suspected association with Freemasonry.124 Whether this, or other reasons, resulted in the 
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appointment of De Ceuninck later that summer is unclear, but it marked another episode of 
unwarranted stress in Belgian civil-military relations at what was a crucial juncture in its military 
preparations. Moreover, it did little to alter the general situation.  
 Within two years De Ceuninck also retired, precipitating another change at the head of the 
military establishment. The questionable appointment of Lieutenant-General Antonin De Selliers de 
Moranville, aged 62, was again commented on by the press. La Chronique ŶŽƚĞĚ ? ‘ŝŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ ?Ɛ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ǁĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝƚ ? Q ?ĂƐŵĞƌĞůǇĂŶŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďůĞĞŶĚƚŽĂĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ?125 This turnover 
ŚĂĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĚĞǀĂƐƚĂƚŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?hŶĚĞƌ:ƵŶŐďůƵƚŚ ?ƉůĂŶƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďǇĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐŵŽƐƚ
promising Staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Baron de Ryckel, to abandon the policy of central 
mobilisation in favour of concentrating forces nearer the frontiers. It reflected the post-1911 
appreciation within certain quarters of the French-inspired offensive à outrance, which might see the 
Belgian army operate more aggressively than had previously been envisaged.126 These ideas had found 
approval with the King, whose military advisor, Émile Galet, was himself an advocate of fighting on 
the frontiers, albeit on the defensive.127 Yet, with the appointments of De Ceuninck and De Selliers, 
ĚĞZǇĐŬĞů ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐǁĞƌĞĐĂƐƚĂƐŝĚĞ ?Ğ^ĞůůŝĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽŚĂĚ been at the head of the Gendarmerie since 
1904, was completely detached from the latest currents of strategic thinking. Neither blessed with 
originality nor dynamism, he merely reverted to the age-old concept of central mobilisation and 
operational defence. As late as 30 July 1914, De Selliers submitted a memorandum dictating the 
withdrawal of divisions from the Meuse to the central plain, but the King objected and ordered 
ŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĐŽŵŵĞŶĐĞĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŐĂƌƌŝƐŽŶƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?128 Although somewhat outpaced by 
events, which prevented the army from concentrating as much force on the Meuse as desired, it was 
able to adopt positions facing all borders by 3 August in accordance with its neutral status. Unable to 
operate as aggressively as some would have liked, the Belgian army improvised to meet the German 
threat towards Liège the following day, fighting a delaying action until the weight of numbers and 
heavy shell forced its retreat towards Antwerp. 
VII 
dŚĞĞůŐŝĂŶĂƌŵǇ ?ƐƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǁĂƌǁĞƌĞƐŽŵĞǁhat shambolic. Few could say it was truly ready 
by 1914. Over-confidence among the political elite that neutrality and independence would be 
respected after 1870, sadly offered its likely aggressors encouragement to betray this faith. Delays in 
the introduction of universal conscription, a lack of general investment in its defensive system and 
conflicting views in strategic thinking all contributed to opening the country up to Great Power 
interference. While German planners had all but disregarded Belgian neutrality by the 1890s, the 
Entente  W particularly Britain  W continued to nominally express a desire to see the Treaty of London 
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respected. As such, preparations for a future Franco-'ĞƌŵĂŶǁĂƌďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƚŝĞĚƚŽĞůŐŝƵŵ ?Ɛ
seemingly discordant attitude towards neutrality. The staff talks of 1906 and 1912 were as much an 
attempt to obtain assurances over Belgian intentions as they were to develop a coherent, but 
unbinding, plan of action. Although initially valued by the Belgians, these approaches came to nothing 
as diplomatic incidents caused a cooling in relations. Belgium was forced to contemplate the prospect 
of facing an invasion alone, whilst Britain fell increasingly into joint-planning with the French. Amidst 
the mutual suspicion and the increasŝŶŐƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐ
consumed the Entente, who failed to fully comprehend the ramifications of its actions. Suggestions in 
1912 that Belgian sovereignty might be subverted in order to gain the strategic initiative reflected the 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŬŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ďƵƚŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐŐƌŽǁƚŚĂƐĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?
Having arrived as a European power, it could now act and expect to be treated accordingly.  
Neutrality, but particularly independence, dominated Belgian preparations. Evidence 
suggested that neither Germany nor France were prepared to forgo the advantages that reneging on 
their Treaty obligations would offer. In Britain, however, Belgium had a long-standing supporter that 
appeared to respect its rights. Yet, a combination of factors, including Entente diplomatic 
mismanagement, caused Belgian planners to take note of the realities of the situation and to confront 
them with a previously unseen strength of character. In contrast to 1906, Belgium was no longer 
prepared to entertain the notion of military co-operation with any of its Guarantors. If war came to 
Belgium, it preferred to retain the liberty of action to act in its own best interests. As such, the 
deployment of the BEF became wedded to operations in France, despite continued preference for 
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶĞůŐŝƵŵ ?/ŶƚŚĞĞŶĚ ?ĂƐ<ĞŝƚŚtŝůƐŽŶƉŽƐŝƚĞĚ ? ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ&ǁĂƐƐĞŶƚŽĨĨďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ
existed; to France because it was thought the French needed it, because all pre-war planning had been 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞŽĨƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞĨŽƌŝƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚǁŽƵůĚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞďĞĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚ ? ?129 
&ƌŽŵ:ŽĨĨƌĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?&ƌĞŶĐŚĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞůŐŝƵŵǁĂƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽŶ
diplomatic grounds, resulting in the implementation of Plan XVII and the costly thrust towards the lost 
provinces. Only once Brussels appealed for help to its guarantors on 4 August 1914 could the Entente 
contemplate moving into Belgium; though, by this point, the strategic initiative had largely been lost. 
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